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Symposium

The Globalization of Corporate and Securities Law: An
Introduction to a Symposium, and an Essay on the Need for
a Little Humility When Exporting One's Corporate Law
FranklinA. Gevurtz*
This symposium is the brainchild of my colleague, Kojo Yelpaala. He suggested
that the two of us organize and co-chair, as the 2002 Annual McGeorge International
Law Symposium, a symposium on "The Globalization of Corporate and
Securities Law in the Twenty-First Century." Our choice of this topic was based
upon the recognition that corporations play a critical role in the global
economy-often a more important role than many nation states.'
The symposium took place in February of 2002. We organized the
symposium around three panels. The first panel looked at the topic of comparative
corporate governance; in other words, these panelists were concerned with the
rules and structures governing the inner workings of large corporations. The
subject of comparative corporate governance has become a preeminent topic in
corporate law scholarship in recent years,2 and we were pleased to have a panel
containing some of the leading U.S. and foreign scholars on the subject. The
second panel stepped back from this internal governance (or "subatomic") view
of the corporate universe, and examined the transactions which take place
between corporations and investors on stock markets around the world. A look
during any trading day at CNBC, CNN or BBC World News illustrates how
interconnected the stock markets in New York, London, Frankfurt, Tokyo, Hong
Kong, and elsewhere have become. As a result, it is critical to address whose
laws regulate disclosure concerning stocks traded on various securities markets.
We were pleased that the panel on international securities regulation contained
some of the most influential scholars writing in the field. The final panel stepped
back from this bipolar (corporation-and-investor) view of the corporate universe, to
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1. E.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 121 (2002) (noting that the annual sales of many large multinational corporations can exceed the gross domestic
product of most nations).
2. E.g., Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United
Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459 (2001); Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global"
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNEL.L INT'L L.J. 321 (2001); Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path

Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL J. CORP. L. 147 (2001);
Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditionsto Separating Ownershipfrom Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000);

Michael Bradley et al., The Purposesand Accountability of the Corporationin Contemporary Society: Corporate
Governance at a Crossroads,62 L. & CONTEWP. PROB. 9 (1999); John C. Coffee, The Future as History: Prospects

for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999); William
Bratton & Joseph McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against
Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1999).
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examine the impacts that corporations have on other groups around the world,
including workers, consumers, and indigenous populations. The passions ignited
by this topic have been acted out in recent years on the streets of Seattle, Genoa,
and other cities hosting meetings dealing with globalization. The final panel
consisted of persons who have been in the forefront of scholarship or of professional
dealings addressing the role and regulation of multinational corporations.
It is my great pleasure to write an introduction to the papers which came out of
this symposium. Viewed individually, these papers represent a fine collection of
articles addressing a number of aspects of the globalization of corporate and securities
law. In this introductory essay, however, I want to discuss one overriding lesson
which struck me when considering these papers as a group. Quite a cottage industry
has developed among legal professionals engaged in the export of their nations'
corporate and securities laws to other countries (particularly to countries with
developing or transition economies).3 It is tempting for such professionals to
assume (1) that having the best corporate and securities laws is a key to national
prosperity, and (2) that the laws one seeks to export are the best. The overarching
lesson I found emerging from these papers is the need for restraint in making these
two suppositions. This probably should not be surprising, since such humility is
often the lesson to emerge from comparative and international studies.
I. PAPERS DEALING WITH COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The first four papers in this symposium deal with comparative corporate
governance. We begin with a paper from Brian Cheffins, who is the S.J. Berwin
Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law at the University of Cambridge and
Professorial Fellow at Trinity Hall. Professor Cheffins is perhaps the foremost
expert on comparative corporate governance in England. Professor Cheffin's paper,
Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from Australia," looks at the
experience of Australia in order to address a topic that has dominated comparative
corporate governance scholarship in recent years.
The field of comparative corporate governance raises numerous issues: twotier versus single-tier boards,5 co-determination versus election of directors solely
by the shareholders,' and shareholder primacy norm versus stakeholder models
In recent years, however, discussion of these sort of specific technical differences

3. This phenomenon is nothing new. See, e.g., Masao Fukushima, The Significance of the Enforcement of the
Company Law Chapters of the Old Commercial Code in 1893, 24 L. INJAPAN 171 (1991) (describing the work of
Hermann Rossler in drafting Japanese corporate law in the late 1800s).
4. See Brian Cheffins, CorporateGovernance Convergence: Lessonsfrom Australia, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 13
(2002).
5. See, e.g., Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance:A Glimpse at German
Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819 (1996).
6. See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor
Representation on CorporateBoards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338 (1984).
7. See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 2.
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between different nations' corporate laws have become subsumed into a much
more global (if I might be forgiven the pun) comparison. Commentators have
noted that the international corporate world (at least focusing on the large
companies) seems to be divided into two realms.' In one corner, we have the
United States and England. Here, large corporations typically have widely dispersed
stockholdings in which no individual shareholder or cohesive group of shareholders
own more than a small fraction of the outstanding stock. Under these circumstances,
the traditional notion that shareholders control the corporation by selecting who will
serve on the board is entirely unrealistic. 9 By contrast, large corporations in many
other nations, such as Germany and Japan, commonly have substantial portions
of their outstanding stock held by a limited number of large block shareholders.
In such circumstances, the large block shareholders can and do exercise considerable
control over the corporation. 0 Of course, from the perspective of a law journal
symposium, the question becomes what does this difference in the pattern of
shareholdings between different nations have to do with the law. A couple years
back, studies by a group of economists found an interesting statistical correlation
between different legal systems (common law versus civil law), as well as different
corporate law rules (with respect to minority shareholder protections), and the
pattern of stockholdings." Specifically, common law systems and greater
minority shareholder protections appear to correlate with dispersed stockholdings,
while civil law systems and less minority protections seem to correlate with large
block ownership.' 2 This possible impact of law on shareholding patterns, in turn,
raises three questions. The first question is descriptive: Does a difference in law,
in fact, produce a difference in the pattern of stock ownership in large corporations?
The second question is normative: Is one pattern of stockholdings more efficient
than another so that the law should seek to promote dispersed shareholdings or large
block shareholdings? The third question is predictive: As the world increasingly
moves toward an integrated economy in which corporations of different nations
must compete with each other, will one pattern of stockholding or the other
prevail, or perhaps will corporations move to some hybrid in the middle?
The temptation for those in the legal business (law professors, law makers
and lawyers) is to assume a positive answer to the first question (law matters),
focus on the second question (which pattern of shareholding is best), and then
adopt laws designed to bring about the desired pattern in order to avoid leaving
the third question (what form will prevail) to the forces of natural evolution.

8. E.g., Roe, supra note 2.
9. E.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTrZ CORFORATION LAW § 3.1.5a (2000); Brian R. Cheffins, Current Trends in
Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto, 10 DUKE.J. COMP. & INT'L LAW. 5 (1999).
10. E.g., Roe, supra note 2, at 542-44.
11. Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael
La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
12. See id.
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Indeed, in a recent article, 3 I noted that this sort of reasoning represents the principal
articulated rationale expressed by nations around the world when adopting laws
prohibiting insider trading. In an earlier work, 4 Professor Cheffins observed that
as logical and appealing as the "law matters" thesis might be, it does not seem to
match the historical experience in the United States and England. In the paper
appearing in this symposium, Professor Cheffins uses Australia as a test subject
to examine both laws, and a number of other possible explanations for the differing
pattern of stockholdings. While Professor Cheffins suggests that the Australian
experience is at least somewhat consistent with the "law matters" thesis, the
indeterminacy of this result, and the numerous other possible factors behind the
differences in stockholdings evidenced by the Australian experience, provide a
much needed lesson in humility for those too eager to assume undue significance to
the corporate law rules they might seek to export.
The next paper dealing with comparative corporate governance comes from
Stephen Bainbridge, who is a Professor of Law at the University of California,
Los Angeles, School of Law. Professor Bainbridge's extensive scholarship has
addressed a variety of issues in corporate and securities law, and he is the coauthor of one of the most widely used corporate law casebooks in the United
States."' Professor Bainbridge's paper, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the
Convergence Debate," contains a different lesson on the need for humility in the
export of corporate laws: specifically, legal experts must be clear and accurate
about their own country's law when they seek to export such a law to another country.
To illustrate the need for clarity and accuracy, Professor Bainbridge points to
the work of those who seek to export the United States' "shareholder primacy
norm" to the corporate laws of other countries. 7 The problem lies in defining what is
meant by "shareholder primacy." Commonly, reference to the shareholder primacy
norm in corporate law scholarship refers to purpose of a business corporationi.e., that the primary purpose of a business corporation is to make money for the
shareholders." Professor Bainbridge agrees, without much discussion, that this
represents an accurate statement of prevailing corporation law in the United States."

13. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalizationof Insider Trading Prohibitions,15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 63 (2002).
14. Cheffins, supra note 2.
15. WiLLIAM A. KLEIN Er AL, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 2000). In the interest of fairness to Professor Bainbridge and full
disclosure to the reader, I should mention that Professor Bainbridge is also the author of a treatise on corporate law,
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2002), which competes with my treatise on the
subject, FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW (2000).
16. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Directorv. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 45 (2002).
17. E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439
(2001).
18. E.g., Roe, supra note 2, at 554.
19. Actually, the proposition that the primary goal of a business corporation must be to make money for the
shareholders might not constitute an entirely accurate a statement of prevailing corporate law in the United States. For
one thing, judicial pronouncements to this effect have been more a matter of rhetoric, than of setting forth an
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Professor Bainbridge worries, however, that reference to shareholder primacy will be
misinterpreted to suggest that control by shareholders is the norm when it comes to
the distribution of power within the corporation under prevailing laws in the United
States-whereas, when it comes to the distribution of power within the corporation,
the law in the United States contemplates, according to Professor Bainbridge, a
director primacy norm.20

In what turned out to be useful coincidence, the next paper in this symposium
may illustrate Professor Bainbridge's concern. This paper comes from Winfried
van den Muijsenbergh. Mr. van den Muijsenbergh is a principal in the Dutch law firm
of Loyens & Loeff and has extensive experience in the practice of corporate law. Mr.
van den Muijsenbergh's paper, Corporate Governance: The Dutch Experience,"'
discusses recent efforts of corporate governance reform in the Netherlands.
It is interesting to juxtapose Mr. van den Muijsenbergh's paper against Professor
Bainbridge's. In fact, as Mr. van den Muijsenbergh's paper discusses, the present
Dutch corporate governance regime provides an example of extreme director
primacy, with shareholders often lacking even the ability vote on whom shall be
the directors. The reforms discussed by Mr. van den Muijsenbergh are designed
to give shareholders more power in order to bring Dutch corporate law closer to
the Dutch perception of United States' norms.
Mr. van den Muijsenbergh's paper also contains yet another lesson on the
need for humility in the export of corporate law. As his discussion of the Dutch
East India Company (founded in the beginning of the Seventeenth Century)
illustrates, efforts at making corporate boards of directors into effective institutions
of governance have been going on for some time. Moreover, the experience of
the Dutch East India Company-which may have been influenced by the earlier
formed English East India Company, and which, in turn, influenced the formation of
French and other European East India Companies-shows how the convergence in
the structures of different nations' corporations, under the pressure of competing in a
global economy, is a centuries old phenomenon.
While the Netherlands has a long experience with corporate governance, the
same cannot be said of Russia. Russia was late among European nations to move
out of a largely feudal economic organization and spent most of the twentieth
century under Communism. Hence, when Russia embarked upon privatizing its

enforceable standard against which to review specific management decisions. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real
About CorporateSocial Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 645, 648-50 (2002).
Moreover, the adoption by numerous states of so-called other constituency statutes has undermined the shareholder
primacy norm by allowing, if not commanding, directors to take into account the interests of other stakeholders in
making decisions for the corporation. Id. at 647-48.
20. The proposition that directors, in reality, control large corporations in the United States provoked a
vigorous exchange during the symposium. In questions following Professor Bainbridge's presentation, John Scriven,
former General Counsel for Dow Chemical Corporation, argued that officers, in fact, control the typical large
corporation, with directors generally doing little more than acting as rubber stamps for management decisions.
21. See Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, The Dutch Experience, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 63 (2002).
22. E.g., M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTOL.J. 74,92-93 (1939-1940).
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industrial enterprises in the 1990s, it provided a natural market for those eager to
export their corporate laws. The next paper in the symposium comes from
someone with a front row view of the export of Western style corporate laws to
Russia. Roswell Perkins (who had been President of the American Law Institute
during its turbulent effort to formulate principles of corporate governance for the
United States) is the former head of the Debevoise & Plimpton LLC Moscow
office from 1997 through 2001. Mr. Perkins' paper, The FCSM Corporate
Governance Code for Russian Companies," discusses a new code of corporate
conduct promulgated by Russia's Federal Commission on the Securities Market.
Unfortunately, the consensus of most observers has been that Russia's efforts
at privatization have been a disaster, as a "kleptocracy" looted many of the newly
private corporations. 24 Accordingly, critics might ask whether the sort of corporate
code discussed by Mr. Perkins will improve things, particularly given the voluntary
nature of this new code. Yet, perhaps the voluntary nature of the new code simply
renders transparent the situation that already had existed. Specifically, one explanation
for the failure of Russian privatization finds that the problem did not lie primarily
in the corporate or securities laws Russia adopted, but rather in the lack of a legal
infrastructure (including such things as honest and competent judges and prosecutors)
to enforce the laws." Still, this is not to say that the new Russian code described
by Mr. Perkins is pointless. Rather, even voluntary codes may help to create
(albeit slowly) another building block toward honest corporate governance; this
being the establishment of norms of honesty among corporate managers.26 All told,
the Russian experience provides a powerful lesson in the need to understand the
limits of what corporate law can do on its own when transplanted to developing and
transition economies.
II. PAPER DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
When we began to organize this symposium in the Spring of 2001, U.S.
corporate and securities law seemed triumphant. Indeed, some scholars had
proclaimed the "end of history" for corporate law, with the rest of the world
inevitably copying the United States.17 By the time this symposium took place in
February of 2002, things had started to change with the Enron scandal then
unfolding. Over the summer, while the symposium papers were being completed

23. See Roswell B. Perkins, The FCSM Code of Corporate Governance for Russian Companies, 16
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 75 (2002).
24. E.g., Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1731 (2000).
25. Id.; see also Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditionsfor Strong Securities Markets, 48
UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Laws, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001) (discussing the role of non-legally enforceable rules and standards in corporate
governance).
27. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2.
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and submitted for publication, the crisis in U.S. corporate and securities laws

Enron.2
intensified, as scandals involving WorldCom, Tyco, and others followed
The reaction at the symposium to this crisis came from the panel dealing with
international securities regulation.
The paper in this symposium dealing with international securities regulation
comes from Stephen Choi, who is a Professor of Law at the University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall) and an increasingly influential scholar in
corporate and securities law. Defying the political stereotypes an outsider might
have about scholars from Berkeley, Professor Choi has been a leading proponent
(along with Professor Roberta Romano of Yale 9) of free market solutions when it
comes to the regulation of securities offerings in increasingly international
markets. 0 This free market approach draws from the principle of U.S. (and,
increasingly, other nations')31 corporate law, under which the law of the state of
incorporation governs the so-called internal affairs of a corporation-even if the
corporation's business and shareholders are entirely outside of this state."
Professor Choi and others have argued that securities regulation, similarly, ought
to allow those in charge of corporations to choose which nation's law will govern
the company's disclosure obligation to prospective shareholders, even if those
shareholders are in a country other than the one whose law is selected. Of course,
advocates of such an approach face the challenge that the result of such
regulatory competition will be a race toward laxity, as those in charge of
corporations pick the nation with the weakest investor protections.33 The reply,
typically, is a replay of the market force arguments which have triumphed in dealing
with corporate governance laws-specifically, that investors will discount the
price of stock to take into account less legal protections, thereby deterring the
selection of inefficient regulatory regimes. 4 Needless to say, recent events
involving Enron, WorldCom, and the like cause one to question the faith which
some have placed in securities markets to avoid problems of deregulation.35
28. E.g., Special Report: The Best and Worst Boards:How Corporate Scandals Are Sparking a Revolution in
Governance,BUS. WEEK, Oct. 7,2002, at 104, 105-06.
29. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 77 YALE L.J. 2359
(1998). Professor Romano also appeared on our international securities regulation panel and addressed the implications
of the Enron scandal. Professor Romano's presentation will be published as part of a book she is authoring on the
subject of international securities regulation.
30. Stephan J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of
SecuritiesRegulation, 71 S. CAL L. REV. 903 (1998).
31. See, e.g., Case Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.I-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551
(1999) (requiring Denmark to register an English corporation formed by Danish nationals to circumvent Danish
corporate law minimum capital requirements).
32. E.g., McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).
33. The classic exposition of this "race to the bottom" thesis in the corporate law context is William L. Cary,
Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974).
34. E.g., Romano, supra note 29, at 2421.
35. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modem Business
Corporation:Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CH. L. REV. 1233, 1241-43 (2002). In her presentation at the symposium,
Professor Romano argued that market forces were acting to correct many of the abuses which led to Enron's downfall.
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In his paper, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market,"
Professor Choi responds to the challenge of recent corporate events by reminding
us of the need for humility when exporting securities laws. Specifically, if recent
events show that securities markets are flawed because of the inevitable foibles
of those who participate in them, it still remains true that securities regulations
also are often flawed because of the inevitable foibles of those who promulgate
and enforce them. After all, the Enron, WorldCom and other recent scandals
show the fallibility of the U.S. securities laws-which, until recently, have been
held up as probably the most demanding in the world.37 Still, if Enron suggests a
need for humility in exporting U.S. securities laws, it also shows the need for a
little humility in exporting academic theories, placing too much faith in market
efficiency as a substitute for regulation.

III. PAPERS DEALING WITH THE REGULATION OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
The final three papers in the symposium deal with the regulation of multinational
corporations. The first of these papers is from Douglas Branson, holder of the W.
Edward Sell Chair in Business Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
Professor Branson is a prolific corporate and securities law scholar whose views
stand in contrast with the more laissez-faire oriented philosophies of some of the
earlier participants in the symposium. Professor Branson's paper, The Social
Responsibility of Large MultinationalCorporations,"takes a highly critical look
at the impact of the growth of multinational corporations.
Professor Branson's paper provides a useful counterpoint to some of the
positions taken in the earlier papers. For instance, while Professor Bainbridge
accepts without discussion the norm that the purpose of corporate management
should be to make money for the shareholders (even if decisions directed toward
achieving this goal lie with the directors, rather than with the shareholders),

For example, the rapid decline in Arthur Anderson's business as a result of its participation in Enron's questionable
accounting practices reinforces the notion that market forces constrain the misdeeds of firms, such as accounting firms,
that depend on their reputation for monitoring the honesty of others. (Indeed, after the symposium, Arthur Anderson
declared bankruptcy). Along the same lines, Professor Romano argued that the stock market was correcting by
showing greater skepticism toward earnings reported by firms employing aggressive accounting practices. The
problem, however, is that the market typically overcorrects, and, indeed, in the summer following the symposium,
worries about the spreading corporate scandals triggered a broad decline in the stock market, both in the United States
and abroad, which, in turn, seems to have slowed the recovery in the general economy. In fact, concern about the stock
market's tendency to overreact-punishing good issuers with the bad-constituted one motivation behind the
enactment of the securities laws following the 1929 stock market crash. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 9, at § 6.2.2.
36. See Stephen Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 11
(2002).
37. E.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 673 n. 107; Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitragefor Real: International
SecuritiesRegulation in a World InteractingSecurities Markets,38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563, 566 (1998).
38. See Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large MultinationalCorporations,16 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 121 (2002).
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Professor Branson's paper reminds us that a single-minded drive for shareholder
gain can create negative impacts on other groups affected by the operations of
multinational corporations. Also, while Professor Choi expresses confidence in
regulatory competition in the fields of corporate and securities laws, Professor
Branson reminds us that such regulatory competition can produce poor consequences
if applied to environmental, labor and other laws (where there might be more
danger that those choosing lax regulatory regimes can externalize the costs of
their choice on other parties who lack realistic market protection).39
In the end, however, Professor Branson's paper returns us to the lesson of
humility in the export of corporate law, when he questions whether corporate law
can provide the solution for the social problems created by multinational corporations.
In this regard, Professor Branson's paper stakes out a different position from some
other recent so-called "progressive" corporate law scholarship, which views tinkering
with corporate laws to be means for achieving labor and other social welfare
goals. 40 Interestingly, the history of corporations provides an insight into the
limits of corporate law as a tool to curb arguably dangerous growth in the power
of large corporations. Much of the Nineteenth Century evolution in U.S. corporate
law involved the gradual undermining of limits imposed by early corporate
legislation that sought to curb the economic power of corporations. This race
toward laxity was the result of competition between states seeking to attract
corporate charters.4' Yet, where corporate law failed, other laws such as antitrust
and other regulatory statutes were enacted to fill the breach. History also
provides some solace for those inclined to despair at the power of the current
multinational corporation. Earlier, Mr. van den Muijsenbergh reminded us of the
Dutch East India Company, which, like its English cousin and other English and
European trading companies possessed powers over vast territories and numerous
inhabitants that would make the modern multinational corporation envious. 4' At
least the current multinationals cannot raise large armies and navies and act as a
law unto themselves, as did these earlier global corporations. We have made
progress.

39. 1 should, however, note a question regarding this point that my colleague, Claude Rohwer, posed to
Professor Branson in the question-and-answer session following Professor Branson's presentation. Professor Rohwer,
who has been a consultant for the Vietnamese government in drafting its commercial laws, asked Professor Branson
whether the individual Vietnamese, who left their farms to work in Nike factories, felt that, despite the poor working
conditions and wages, they were better off than they were before. The problem illustrated by this question, of course, is
that actions by multinational corporations, which some might view as exploitation, might appear to others to offer
persons in developing countries a better existence than they otherwise faced.
40. E.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law
as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002).
41. E.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-65 (1933) (Brandise, J., dissenting); Joel Seligman, A
BriefHistory of Delaware's GeneralCorporationLaw of 1899, 1DEL J. CORP. L. 249 (1976).
42. E.g., John P. Davis, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS
COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO THE AUI1-ORITY OF THE STATE 158-59 (1904); GEORGE CAWSTON &

A.H. KEANE, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES 210 (1896).
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If corporate law is not the answer to corporate social responsibility, what is?
Professor Branson suggests one possibility might lie in the actions of international
organizations (such as the WTO) and in so-called "soft law" (such as environmental,
labor, and similar guidelines adopted by non-governmental organizations, to which
multinational corporations can subscribe in order to obtain a "seal of approval"
for socially conscious consumers). Conveniently enough, the role of international
organizations, such as the WTO, in regulating the activities of multinational
corporations is the subject of the next paper in the symposium. The next paper
comes from Cynthia Day Wallace, who has had a long and distinguished career in
international trade and development, including serving as the Senior Advisor to the
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
Dr. Wallace is also the author of a pair of books addressing the regulation of
multinational corporations.43

Dr. Wallace's paper, The Legal Framework for Regulating the Global
Enterprise Going into the New WTO Trade Round-A Backward and a Forward
Glance,44 lays the groundwork for understanding the prospective WTO negotiations
on foreign direct investment, which are likely to occur as a result of the Doha
Declaration calling for a new round of trade negotiations dealing with development
issues. Dr. Wallace's paper contains its own lesson on the need for humility in
seeking solutions through the law-including treaties and international guidelinesto the problems posed by multinational corporations. As Dr. Wallace's discussion
suggests, these treaties and guidelines reflect an inherent tension between the desire
to promote the foreign investment and economic development which flows from the
activities of multinational corporation on the one hand, and the need to regulate
the potentially detrimental consequences posed by the activities of such entities,
on the other hand. Resolving this tension, in turn, reflects fundamentally not a
legal, but rather an economic and political question upon which judgments
radically differ.
The next paper comes from John Scriven, who was the General Counsel of
Dow Chemical Corporation for many years and has a long experience in viewing
problems of corporate social responsibility from inside a multinational corporation.
Needless to say, Mr. Scriven's paper provides an important counterpoint to
Professor Branson's highly critical outsider's view of the multinational corporation.
Interestingly enough, however, once one looks beyond the predictable areas of
disagreement, there is much convergence between Professor Branson's and Mr.
Scriven's papers. Both papers see the forces for corporate social responsibility
lying largely beyond the realm of traditional corporate law. Instead, both outsider
and insider find the forces for corporate social responsibility to lie in other
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national and international regulatory laws and structures, and especially in soft
law-the culture which governs the actors in the multinational enterprise. The
difference is that Professor Branson sees the glass as half-empty (if I might be
forgiven the clich6), with multinational corporations needing a strong push toward
responsibility from regulations and the pressure of soft law, whereas Mr. Scriven
views the glass as half-full, with significant regulation impacting the actions of
managers of multinational corporations, who even without such regulation, commonly
reflect the socially responsible ethos of the nations from which the executives come.
In reading symposia, I have noticed that introductions which attempt to go
beyond the barest descriptive level serve as something as a Rorschach test for the
symposium's organizer; in other words, the lessons the introduction derives from
the papers may reflect the preconceived notions of the person writing the
introduction. I suspect this may be true of my introduction to these papers, in
which event the reader may well expect to draw very different precepts from
these papers than did I. Whatever the lessons one draws, reading these papers
should be a worthwhile experience.

